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the bu bon ic olagile1 c CCOInric dCvcloprIrcit gu:rcrall.v ot r opportunity itb 1345--1348) . guarantecing ,smanY a%43 million Furopc.11 died, irIcluding aCs short-run emergency supplies inluch as r-sv i-thirds and tor supporting the nany tasks Famines are generally caused by decline in food production in successive years brought about by poor weather, war, or both. The consequent complex interactions lveen prices, employment, and assets impoverish be-. ictims and iead to sharply increased mortality. Government policy iF a key determiinant as to whether or not these conditions mature into wiscspread fhmine. India and Bangladesh have succeeded in controlling famines in recent years, but problems in most of Africa remain intractable due to civil unrest and a paucity of resources, including trained people, institutions, and infrastruLcture. General economic development and political consensus is needed to reduce Africa's vulnerability to famine. In this context, judiciously provided fbreign aid can be of immense help.
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IIIno I'RY AN) IN alnost ever-crner Of the gIbC. With economic dCVClOpIrcnt, the lObal incidence ii Ifliln is declining, except in Africa, wlIereC such disisters ci I tothreaten with increasing rcgtlaritv. liith preparedness fir these remaining vcstigc-Ofttmnlc and their cvntual cljnination require thi urgltfl actions alter And bcrwccn rrises. Tackling tnimir.c also requires pi ilitical coiinmitrrent by rich nations that can contribute ki!,-hoW arid resources ?nd by noorcr nations that must r:spond to the needs o'tl,cir citizenrv.
One oftthc earliest aceOints Ofrminire, was rccoitdcd uii stone more than 0010 vt.ars agi , but the misery and depri'atri of tamiric iTrtainlv predate written history ,1I.Since A.I. 10, the t.United Kirgdomn Irs sutL.rcd rmore than 181) finrcs (1)-ind beteccn 106 B.C. and 1929, (Ih1na had 1828 famines, an as-erage of'90 faliies in each 101 years (2). In faincs assiiciated \sit
Of the Itali arn p ipu Iation 2i.FiVe hindrcd Years later, becausc of a blight ot the por.to crip, apprixirnatc, I million (r(,uih1y 12 perccnt) Irish perished an.! an equal number migrated .3, 4). \Vher Joseph predicted rhat seven I't years would be hilhis-ed b seven lean vears, the Phatai h ordered tIhe granariCs stocked, "that thc land perish not th i li , i inc' (5).
The mo0dern erat ceritinls-his nor bceo free oh famnine. Because famrniic typically strikes itpiscrishcd arcas with a histiry of' high mortality rates arid p rtccord-kceping, death counts are mostly guesswi rk. MIOre than 3 million peoIe iav have perished in the great Bengal irnine ofi 1943 in 1974 another 1.5 million nirori that regior starved in tc lne\v ciuntrv of Barigladesh (6, 7). China suffered a hnorrific famine from 1959 to 1961 that was k,:pt secret from the otutsidC world. E';tirnatcs ut'mortality range from 16 to 64 million, depending oithe definitions nid nrcthlcds of calculation, but it was clcarly the ssorst fariine of the 2001 ccrituix (8).
Famine is not a nieVcolcr to Africa, whichl has stffercd from localized famiries tir centuries. Recent ftmincs have caught world i0 JANUARY 1987 -atentiolt tile t" death n as scale and media coverage have grown. In the early 1 9 70's, famine struck man' corners Of' the continent simnUitanc OtslV; dcath estimates wre 100,000 in the sparsely popt latcd Sahelian countries of Mauritania, Senegal, Burkina Faso, (Jhad. Niger. .rid IMali. and 200,000 in Ethiopia stmates san V frOir 7.,000 to 1.5 nl111 0i civilians in the [1968] [1969] war-related tiotine in a ,afr.i 9-a11A. ccurate fillrmation n the 1983-1985 Sr-ninc inIAttica is sca.nt, and disaster appears to be cOntinuing as drught. IOctIts, and ci\il w\',Ir plague cCtin ciiountries. Such piiblcns suggest tht small Fvnnc', trequerC tlV riaa' go ,unoticcd in isolated areas.
Famine sItIrlId be distlnguishcd front chronic hunger. Although both are srptois Oft pusVCm-aindl a lack iftf'ooL, Ifminc is an extreme on the hlugCr cintinttui1i. It is distinguished by large-scale Ioss Of Iife, sOcial disruption, and an economic chaoi tlat destroys pr ductuiOn pitCntlI (1,t). Svnnptos tinlude migration, distress sales of land, lisestock, ind )thcr productive assets, the division and impovcrishnicnt ofsicicrv's poorist families, crime, and di disintc gratin O'cust )lniar moral codes. Breaking this downward spiral rtuitircs special cirts toclifinatW the cause.s uffanminc and mitigate its ctfiects.
Indeed, pogress against tLiriinC is evideCn, today. Mortality estimates indic.tc that in much othflc world, faiines are lessening In their frtquetncy land intensin'. More areas of flc world are ftrnine: tree, and Cven the severest droiights II developed coumries d,n,)t lead to tai tcs. Furthermore, lr,dia, Bangladesh, and a fi w African countries have demonstrated lrhat 'ith careful planning and man, agcnient, very pOi~" developing countries can block the chain of events that traditiOnally hrxad. from :op Kfilure to widespread death.
As or knowledge (fcauses, prevention, and preparedness ex pand., we must take ,,ctmnto abolish futirc ftiines. Today's global tjod surplscs, advancements in international transportation and involved in developing long-rut food sccurin'.
The tndcrlying cause of hlitc iscrop thilure which Undermines incomes of the alrcady very poor. Thc most obvious causes of crop ailurc are bad wseather. cisil disruption, or both. When acrop fails, the subsistence tarrfer is robbed of his sole source of income, the fod lie gros's largely fi consurrnption and for meager sales. For other poor groups, such as landless laborers, wage carriers, and pastoralists, the crop ilure reduces incomes indirectly throughi distorted prices, reduced cniplOmcnt, or a corhinarioi ot the two. These UndCrlyinglfrces can be exacerbated b market disniptions due to hoarding, inflation, or war, and [-\ further changes in the income distribUtiol. Government errors of omission and commission permit dhw natural disaster to niatire into famine. Sen (7) has CphasizCd how lack of income to purchase food can exacerbate flatitc, but .tttention should not be drawn away from the critical role o()airicLtulral productimn indetermining income of the poxr in devchping comutrics and fi(wt monitoring a vital link in the chain of caualniv of fa1minc.
Succession of Poor Crop Years
Seldom does f'am11illc arise from asingle bad growing season. Rural pcoplc can usually absorb such shortfalls by depleting stocks or borrowing itiod and moe\'fronm wealthier relatives and neighbors, although large arincrs are usually better insulated than small ones (12). 1ii';tory has illustrated that the second and subsequent years of crop fiilurc p1)wteucld disaster. For example, in 1966 and 1967 droughts and floods struck India, causing two successive ,'ears of cn p failurC (13) ( Table I ) .!or India ,;sa nation, fod grain producti(o ill firont its prcdrought high by roughly 14 percent in each year. In tile state of Biltiar, farmcrs responded to the dryness by switching from rice to the more drought-resistant maize and millet crops. In the first year ofthc disaster, total food grain production fell only ) percent. lit 1966 and i967 even hardier crops could not contpeisate for tile rice crop failure, and production fell by 45 percent from the 1964-1965 level. The extremely good crop year of 1964-1965 helped protect coitsuIptiort in the following year, but 1966-1967 was characterizcd by prcfaninc conditions of migration, high prices, hoarding, protitcering, and lntngcr.
Recent famines in Africa show asimilar pattern. The disaster that struck the Saheliar states in 1974 wsas tile culmination of 8 \'ears of pKor weather and crops. In 1983 and 1984, drought, floods, and civil Nvar once again crippled Ethiopia, Sudan, and the Sahcl.
The production drop ma' be localized, and aggregate production may not fall ina famine \car. For example, both in1974 and 1984, floods inBangladcsh dcstiru, 'cd aportion of the rice crop; however, the same rains boosted tire harvest in upland regions. Clay (14) cautions that "the paradox otf hiinger without severe loss of productioi depends on the lcvel of aggregation." If a region is defined bod broadly' enough, surpluses will utweigh dficits, although a given locality matV go hurngry. As long as markets arc fragmented by poor trarspcrt and governnent inhibitions to trade and itcorie maintenance ctitirts til,the production loss remains threatening.
P,-ics. hock p~tdictiri otenMendagriultualy toagriultual rices. Shocks to agricultural productionl often send agricultural prices soaring. The poor are squeezed frorm both sides as prices rise for the goods that they buy'and fall for the goods that they sell.
Because food expenditures represent amajor share of aporr family's budget (71 percent, Fig. 1) , a leap in food prices puts a survival diet oLt of reach. A 10 percent decline in food supply leads to declines that differ by class in income, expenditures, and ultimately consump tion; the xorest reduce total food consumption by 35 percent,
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whereas the wealthiest tighten their belts by only 8 percent (Fig. 2) . In iabsolute terms, the poor decrease i eir consumption of food grains more than ten times as much as the wealthy in response to the same decline in supply (15) (l',,ble 2). For those already living on edge, this is famine.
In order to preserve their food grain consumption, the rich adjust by dcc reasing their demand tor LCur' foods and nontitod goods (Fig. 2) . The price tsuch goods in comparison with grain prices tends to tall during eriTods of faimine. The demand for livestock (a major component of"hip protein foods" in Table 2 ) is especially vulnerable. Consumer dCmand for the emaciated beasts collapses while at the same time, herders and farmers sell off livestock to purchase cheaper grain calories, further saturating tile shrunken market. Predictably, nomadic herders have been especially hard hit by African droughts; in sometc regions of Ethiopia in 1974, the exchange rate between animals and grain deteriorated as much as 73 percent (7).
Likewise the large decline in nonifood cxpenditures by the pros perous precipitates dramatic price shifts for discretionary purchases vis-a-vis grain prices. In the Bengal famine, the terms of trade for common goods such as cloth, bamboo umbrellas, milk, fish, and haircuts, all produced by'the poor, deteriorated as much as 70 to 80 percent between lune 1942 and JUI'l 1943 (7).
t:inlopne'nt. E.nployment crumbles as producers and consumers adjust to the decline in agricultural production, further impoverish ing marginal groups. The contrast in employment between a normal and a dr. year in North Arcot, in the state ofTamil Nadu, India, is shown in Table 3 (16). Labor is distinguished by type of family and nature of work. Employment \as considerably lower inthe drought year than in the normal year, about 35 percent for ali groups combined. losses 'ere especially severe for the landless; employ iernt fi'll 40 percent for agrictrlural lab rers and 45 per,:cent for other laborers.
Several forces corntribute to these declines. With less fhrming activity, landowners do not hire as muw farm laborers. In North Arcot, agrictltural employment declined for allbut the largest farmers. Given the futility of rending crops, snall tarmers, agricul tural laxrers and other laborers shifted to low-productivity tasks, such as additional tending of livestock. Second. the fall in demand o' well-to-do consumers tor nonfiod purchases (see Table 2 ) has effects on employment as well as on prices. In the North Arcot example, the nonagricultural sector lost proportionately more jobs than the agrictltural sector. In a situation of economic distress, large 
().
Althlugih war ciinot be blamted solely oil tie national go\crn ieilt, the gI)verllleiltC's response to war greatly iiliuenccs de evoolutioll of a taod crisis. War call ontribttc to ixd crises in several ways, including drawing labor trlol tiod proidluctiOin, dis rupting the Imarketintg of agricultural inputs and crops, destroying fielI s, creating rctiigccs, and hindering relief effirts.
In certaii cases, war has induced tanine in tie absetnce of adverse wcatilcr conditions, lie lfood crisis in Kaipuciea peaked ill 1979 atier a decade of war-iduced uphieaval. Following the U.S. bomb igs and the genocidal and agricultural policies of the Pol Pot rqirnc, thc Vietnanese invasion of Jatlan 1979 dealt a cr iwning blow. Tie icriig Khmer Rouge pirsuecd a "scorched earth policy" (21, p. 84), both destroying and confiscating seeds, crops, and draught anilnals. Cha(s hindered planting and the 1979-1980 rice harvest ssats 6) percent below nornial (22-25).
Anli ft-cited example oCf war-related famine in a developed country is the Netherlands during the World War II. Approximatcl 10,000 people of all social classes starved during the winter of 1944-1945 'Indludes somc nilitarnil' laixr.
when the occupying Nazis blocked the import ot fid supplies (10,
26).
Arnced conflicts coinccicded withI drought conditionsi ini (ihad, Angola, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Mio .mblibiqluc during tile famines of 1983 through 1985 (27, 28) . Tice worst hit regions of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Tigray had been at war with the government for 22 and 9 years, rcspcctivelv (29). Although it iS Unclear %% lielicr the Mwengisti, governmni t tried intntionalhv to starve thc se rcccon, its rctisal tc permit sate passage 1ir rclict' rcani through rlIc war /ii c and its cont cversial rertlemcnt prigram icpeded relict cftb crls (28;.
At ti iic It is te ccnibination 0! war, iismanagcnccit, a.ud pior \e\athe r that Ilacis c toiaiine. li Bengal the policy ci renc ving all bi ats carrying more than ten passcngcrs ftrom the coa t of Bengal and ,the lir,,tatii of cereal and rice trade between provinices hanipcred the flow iff ncd in 1942 (7 
Preparedness and Relief
There are poiiie steps chat gi ,xcrnmcit c~cak ikc warid ci Caiile conditins by insulating tile pi puilaiM fiOili psychlocgical or mental danage, ncigration, inim crishncnt, loss of assets, and death. In order to avoid the haphazardness Oflast-Iiinucc efforts to relievsc\c sc\\idCSprCad sctfecring, gov'erments Juist puC in place mneasures to cope w\itlh the early stages of iii incipient finlinc.
BCcauIsc tiifics scloilcl arise Ov'rnight, policy-ncakcrs nniist be alert to that tlIc.lct le ticd systei or public health. conditions hii The best indicarir cit all is the political sYsteni itself, with its icetwork of politicians secsing cciditions at .ill levels of socict\ . Their observations Of social diiiress carl be scipplementCd With statistical analyses of prices, hoarding, snuggling, transportation bottlenecks, fooid inports, refugees, or nalintrition, and even satellite photograpli (31). Such indicators are specific to the particilar location and require a thorough understanding Of the dy'namics of the ilocal food systcm, which Is why local politicians arc especially well placed. But for lical governmcent to be heard, a central government must be listening. A free press has a major role in aciplil-'ing the messages of distress, carrying them to the capital tfr action by the bureaucracy, and harassing the bureaucracs-for its inattention.
Al carls' warig system sounds the alert. Once the crisis has been detected and diagPSCd, a comCplemcnctary plan of programs and pre~viotsly established emergeni' nCasures niurst be quickly implemegted. As lg ago as the 1880's, India designed its Famine (iiCs in great iletail to respond quickly and etfiicintly to disaster conditions. Similar ideas no\wx arc embodied in the gov-ernment's Drought Management Plan (32). Following the fiood crises of the !'arly 1970's, the Fo()d and Agriculrure Organization of the Unicei Nations set up the Global hifiOrmation and Early Warning System and :he International Emergency twd Reserve.
By trmalizing such procedures, several low-inComC countries have controlled natural disasters from developing into widespread l.,mines. For example, in Bihar, India, syimptons of distress mount cd following successive crop failures. Late in 1966, local administra non was reinforced, communication lines improved, radio famine bulletins issued, and vOluntan' andtlofficial relict bodies formed (33). Existing public works and relief scjeies grew from an average criplovnicnt of 8,0(100 ti a peak of'7 10,000 by the end of ' 1967 (33, 34) . Thc system of' i r price shops and rationing was expanded, ,upportcd in part bY' massive Tjuaitities Of'iuc6d aid. There were in culations given against snallpox and cholera. Water goals were set at 2 gallons pcr pcru ci per day and sucpportcd by well-drilling and water transp, rt proccci. AgricLlttral support included loans, etfi)rts to sav'e crlps, punips, and road projects. Out of a population if 53 million, estimates of starvation deaths (cill\, ranged from tie hlridrils to sevcr i thousands: more severe and widespread airiic was averted (33). Another state of India, Malharashtra, suflk'rcd tiricccoIsecu tive Years of especially hostile \veatier from 1970 to 1972. Food grain production was 18 percent, 29 percent, and 54 pcccnt below and water. A massivc relief' ef rt was Undertaken, again based oi ernlploci nt projects vith a prodlctrxC, dC'lOIpncCnt tcus Oii soiI conscr-vaion, atlhrcstation, canal excavation, irrigation, and drink ing water. Nearly 5 million people werc employed in relief' work during the height 'tthe crisis in 1973 and 1974, Includirg large ncmbers ifwonicl w\lhoc were employed at the same wages as men. l7crccaru and anicmal lives \yere protected bs fod and fcdder distribution schemes, in addition to iiedical rcli vi to combat epidecics. Given the etficienc' ci the state governinict, one may take seriously Subramanian's (35) report that of the 25 to 30 million pcople threatened iccthe rural areas, there no thnine deaths were during the drought period. Of:oirse, chronic hunger and its eflkects c, itincci through the period.
"Tcnsec s aftcr the 1974 calamity, the Bangladeshi government Was fair better prepared for nctural disaster. When mionsoon floodIig iii 1984 wiped out as mcuch as 30 percent of the crops iii some district,, tainc conditions were minimized. Clay (36) points ti better institutions, some earl-warning nechanisnis, better agricul rural data, and the governmnct's greater conmitment and ability to contain the fmine. Since the previouIs disaster, storage capacis halad beei expanieid and distributed throtughout tile coUntv to hasten response time. Eiploynicnt and suppleniental teeding programs were alreadV in place, supporting lixing standards for the poor, and were expanded swhen the crisis mounted. More plentiful agricultural and foreign exchange resouirces better protected firicers from floods and crop tiilures and enhanced tibe country's capacity to import from the world market. Improved donor relations, iIcluding the pr':scncce of mcltilateral World Food prograni and nultisear com mitcints OfOLid aid, kept reliable supplies in the pipcii, e (36, 37).
Botswana, within Africa's Kalahari desert, suflers froni an average of three secerc drought 'cars each decade (38) . In 1975 the gInernnieni tcik the iitial steps toward designing a drought prexc-ntion plan and in 1978 a private group, the Botsswana Society, convened a national sympoisium oi drought (39). In the same s'ear the governient established the Intcrininisteria; Drorght (omint tee; it meets monthly to rc'iC' data oi rain, agricultural conditions, national grain storage levels, donor commitments, and nutritional standards (40). The agricultural indicators signal the need for agricultural support measUrcs such as credit, seed distribution, and cattle bur-outs, and the nutritional data trigger expansion of ongoing tieding programs and employmcnt schemes. During the 1983 drought, Botswana was able to limit tile increase in child malnutrition from 26 to 31 pcrcent, and in this context reportedly withstood tile drought better than its South African neighbors (38). Holm and Morgan suggest several factors contributing to BotswVana's success: disaster measures in drought-prone Botswana are a political neccssity; Botswana's proximity to South Africa benefits its trade and transportation network; diamond mine revenues have strengthend the govcrnmen t's budget and tircign exchange pisitions; and the o muntrv has a politically stable, liberal del(ocracy (38). In additiiin to and as a result of these factors, Botswana receives a geennus .hare it Iircign aid to support its programns.
As Moder science others it,-\\-ippirtunitics ftr climinati,g tiamine.
By radicall' incretsing yicds per acre, science call generate tid margins adcq u.ttc ti withstand weather shocks. Plants cal also be bred tr driighl risiisic; development tifshort-c'le varieties ii Senegal, for example, sa cd the groundirut and millet crops from
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total devastation by erratic rains in recent 'ears (45). Science can also help generate the employment and hence income needed to buy this food. tEvidcnce tom India indicates that high-yielding wheat varieties require 60 percent ilore labor per hectare, but less labor per unit of output, than traditional varieties (40). 1towcver, technology dces not transtfr dircctly. National research institutions Ilmust be established in developing countries to hasten tile adaptation of technolhgies from other agricultural zones. Similarh', modern tarnl inputs, and the institutions to provide them, are needed to complement agricultural research, which relics hcavils' Oil fertilizers, herbicides, ilsecticides, and commercial seed; Meclanization niay he rcesCCs' iV n specific wlere seasonal cases labor sho.tagcs or hw labor [ r,)dLIctiitV prevail.
Transportation, ci itiiliitiiications, and administrative capacity are obviously esseitial iII the long run tor preventing tamines and in the short run tir relic\ing them. Fhc image of the isolated, sell' stflicictit \illage may be romantic but certainly is not practical, particularly as growing populations press against the limited land base. EcoInoiiiic dc\ielOpiICiIt iliands and provides an infrastruc turc capable of' moving goids Ill aiid (Lot Ot the tarming sector. Agricultural commercialization generates the incomes and surpluses ilcccssarn' to absorb occasional disruptions. Relief' Ieasures require roads, ctinltiitiltication, and political tics or else pockets oft amine remain Inaccessible, as ii Eritrea and Tigray, F'thiopia. Food aid used fo r rcct llcas ors Cal be CxtCiidcd into the pist-tfamie period to btld infrastructulre and proidc adminstrat c capact.
Of course, since rapidly growing populations exacerbate tile need for inicreased tiod priduction, timil' planning can also contribute to long-term Caminc prevention. 1-(ioxever, particularly in rural areas. fatmil planiig seems to, accompany or follow tile processes of agricultural gn isyth and commercializatin1.
Tackiing Famines in Africa
Africa has become tile quintessential fanme arena. Reasons for the low marketing and productivity arc complex, Weather ccrtainl' has playcd a role in recent sears. It is unclear whether current drought is part of a long-term trend or short-tein ,-scle, but in recent \cars it has been drier than in the 1950's and cars 1 9 60's ( Fig.. 3) 
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Good policy is difficult in thle tac of' political unrest as govern ments ti' to achieve national unity in the wake of a purposely divisive colonial hi,;tor'. Cooperative ctorts to achieve regional In addition to the need fo; peace and sound policies, Africa must develop its own comlbinatliol of green revolution technologies akin to th(O);C that launched Asian development. This is no minor task, considering the well-known patiny of trained people, resources, and institutions in Africa.
Foreign assistance has an important role to play in solving these problenis. Food and financial aid can be used by African nations to build infrastructure, support relief, employnent, and nutrition projects, as well as provide toreign expertise and training for citizens. Foreign assistance must be applied in the context of the national political environment, an especially difficult task in war torn or once-colonized countries. Thoughtful application off')rcign assistance call help build nations if care is taken to avoid the divisive tendencies of power politics. Though the application of forcign assistance may be inefficient, it is by no means dispensable.
Curing taifine, especially in Africa, takes time. We must not look for miracle shortcuts to a problem that has plagued society for centuries, vet wc muist hesitate no longer. By adopting lessons learned elsewhere, we will gradually be able to treat disaster situations as the\' occur and finally achieve the development that will eradicate thmine. 
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